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Amateur Slaves

AMATEUR SLAVES:

AN

ETHICAL AND L EGAL ANALYSIS

OF THE T REATMENT OF COLLEGE ATHLETES
BY NATHAN

R. CL'RTIS 1

l.

l NTRODL'CTJO~

n April 2006, Reggie Bush, arguably the most high-profile college
athlete of the decade, faced allegations of accepting payments and
improper benefits while still an "amateur" at the University of
Southern California. These widely publicized allegations have brought
the college sports world once again under heavy scrutiny.2 Athletes in
the revenue-producing sports, specifically men's football and basketball,
provide the National Collegiate Athletics Association (NCAA),
universities, coaches, advertisers, television stations, and many more
with hundreds of millions of dollars in profit; yet these same ath letes
are prohibited from so much as accepting a free ride home from
practice. Although the NCAA and most major universities claim that
college athletics have a principally educational purpose, a closer look
at the system reveals just the opposite to be true-it is a multi-billion
dollar industry dependent on the labor of ill-compensated slaves. It
is time to rethink this system as it Yiolates ethical anu legal doctrines.
In this paper I will debunk some of the prevalent myths concerning
college athletics: the NCAA's claim of amateurism, the university
as an educational institution, and the athlete primarily as a student;
analyze two legal challenges facing the CAA-labor and antitrust
issues; and look at the distinct advantages of a pay-for-play system.

I

Nathan R. Curtis is a junior at Brigham Young l.Jni,·ersity majoring in
Physics with a dnuble minor in Spanish and Mathematics. rlc plans to go to law
school and concentrate on iJHcllectual property law. Nathan is from
Cedar llills, Utah.
2
Charles Robinson & Jason Cole, Cash and Carry, Y \HOO! SPORTS, Sept.
14, 2006, http: / I spons.yahoo.com/ ncaaf/ news?slug=ys-bushprobc&proy=yhoo&t
rpe=lgns.
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U. Tlll·. NCAA AND

A~L\Tl.:.l RISM

The NCAA purports as one of its major principles: ''Studentathletes shall be amateurs ... and their participation should be motivated
primarily by education and by the physkal, mental and social benefits to
be derived ... [S]tudent-athletes should be protected from exploitation by
professional and commercial enrerprises."3 lronically, it is precisely the
professional and commercial exploitation of coUege athletes of which
the NCAA is guilty. In the eyes of many the NCAA is the head of a
well-disguised labor cartel that contains its costs by severely limiting
payments to players while standing to make immense profits off their
contributions.4 A thJetes are limited to scholarships - including onfy
tuition and room and board- worth no more than about $30,000 a year
e\·en at d1e most prestigious universities. D espite the NCAA being a
non-profit organization, the executive director brings in over $600,000
a year and other high officials bring in similar amounts. 5 The CAA
irself markets its product and logo,6 and the major conferences market
their games, logos, and even p ermission to use the players, likenesses
and life stories to for-profit televjsion stations for millions of dollars,
thereby promoting the commercial exploitation of student-ath letes.
ln order to preserve its power the r CAA flaunts d1e
amateurism fa<;ade - the idea chat college athletics exist primarily for
talented athletes to further their education and to receive physical
and social benefi ts. The NCAA publishes a three-volume, 1,268
page manual full of restrictions for players and universities to help
maintain amateur status.~ For example, athletes cannot sign with
an agent if they want to maintain eligibility, they must sit out a year
if they transfer from one college to another, and ther cannot earn
3
2006-2007 NCAA Dt\'JSIO'\J I M .-\J\IU.\L 5 (2006), aYailablc at http:/ /w-..vv.~
ncaa.org/library /membership/ division_i_manual/2006-07_d l_manual.pd f.

4

1\KDRE\\' Ztl\IBA.LI:iT, Ll~P.\ID P ROI·ESSlO"'AJ.s: CoMMERCl \1 T~.\1 AND

CONFLICT tN BIG-TIME CoU.EGE SPoRTS

5
6
7

20 (191)9). See tJLro id. at 18.

/d. at 52.
Srt' id. at

4.

ld. at 5.
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more d1an $2,000 from outside employment during the season.~ The
most notable of all regulations is that all college athletes are expressly
prohibited from any sort of pay-for-play, meaning universities cannot
directly pay athletes and, at the same time, athletes cannot use their
sports talent to earn any money above the uni\·ersity scholarship.
Such rules produce some puzzling contradictions. \'\'hy can schools
"pay" players duough scholarships but not through other means?
Does compensation through scholarship not technically negate one's
amateur status? Furthermore, tradttional coUcbre students are not
forbidden from profiting off their talents. A music student can publish
a song and an English student can pro6 t from a book. \'\'hy are athletes
treated differently? The logical response is greed - the NCAA desires
to control its laborers.9 Former Executh'e D irector of the 1 CAA
\\'alter Byers put it best when he said, ..Collegiate amateurism is not a
moral issue. I t is an economic camoufl age for monopoly practice." 111

Ill THE U.

J\'ERSI1'Y AS ,\N EouCATroNAL l NSTITUnoN

Publicly, universities agree \\;th the CAA principle that college
athletics is "motivated primarily by education," but does that explain the
unh ersity's obsession with sports? \X'hy do unh-er<;ities spend millions of
dollars on recruiting, traveling, builtling bigger and better stadiums, etc.?
What is the root of this obsession with sports?T he ans,ver is <.Juite simple.
College sports, namely men•s football and basketball, are big business.
The money generated by these two sports in the last tweh·e
years has increased 300'%, with universities as the primary benefactors.' '
Universities are not the purely etlucational institutions d1ey claim to
be. At the expense of poorly compensated athletes, uniYersities, the
NCAA, major conferences, advertisers, coaches, and te)e, ision stations
8
Zimbalist, s11pm note 4 at 18.
9
Cnug T. Greenle~ CoUege \thJctes Dc:scn·c Some Equity, BL\CI\. bwcs
IN ll!ca-LER Hr>l'CAllnN, Apr. 27, 2000, at62, a\'ailablc at http:/ /w,vw.findarticles.
com/p/articles/mt_mODXK/is_S_I 7 /ai_62297 183/pg_ l.
10
ZI~IB.\LISI, mpra not<.: 4, at 19.
II
Greg Skidmore, Payment for College Football Players in • ebraska, 41
II \R\'. j. 0:-l LEGIS. 319 (2004).
25
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bring in over $4 billion in revenue each year. 12 Universities, through
participation in bowl games alone, can bring in almost $250 million
every December and January. 13 [n 1999, CBS purchased the rights to
broadcast !\{arch Madness, the men's college basketball tOurnament,
for more than $6.2 billion, which trkkles down to d1e universities that
participate. 14 Interestingly, one court of law even noted more than fifty
years ago that "higher education in thjs day is a business and a big one." 15
Critics of college athletic programs point out that only about
40 Di,-ision I-A institutions operate in the black on a yearly basis. 16
They believe that student-athletes are not exploited because colleges
rarely make any profit off of d1eir play. WhjJe it is true that many
universities' books show losses in the area of sports, this could not be
any further from the truth. The first reason is that it is general practice
that revenue from men's football and basketball be used to subsidize
other collegiate sports that do not bring in enough revenue. 17 Based
on data provided by d1e Office of Postsecondary Education, in 2005
Division 1-A men's football and basketball programs brought in total
revenue of more than $2.1 billion, while expenses were only about
$1.3 billion. On d1e other hand, the revenue gained by all other sports
combined was a mere $294 million, about $577 million less than their

12
Letter from ~CAA President Myles Brand to the Honorable William
Thomas, Chairman of the House Committee on Ways and Means (NoY. 13, 2006),
a\railable at http:// www.ncna.org/ portal/ me<.lia_and_e,•cnts/ pn:ss_room/2006/
no,·ember/ 2006111 S_ response_to_housecommitteeonwaysandmcans.pdf.
13
Thomas O'Toole, $lThi BCS Payouts Sound Great, But ... , USA TODAY,
Dec. 6, 2006, at C I, axailablc at http:// \\'\V\V.usatoda}.com/ sporrs/ college/
football/ 2006-12-06-bowl-payouts_x.htm (calculated by summing the per team
payouts in the Bowl Payout Breakdown chart included in the article).
14
GREEl"lU ie, supm note 9, at I.
IS
Unh: of Dem~er v. Nemeth, 257 P.2d 423, 425-426 (Colo. 1953) .
16
Kellr \X'hi1eside, College Athletes Want Cut of Action, liSA Ton.w, Aug.
31,2004, at C.03, m·ailable at http:/ /www.usatoday.com/sports/2004-08-31-toptcn-number-7_x.htm.
17
RJCK TF.t.,.\NDER, Til l! HuNDRED YAno LIE: T11E CoRRPPTION or CoLLEGI:.
FoowuJ ,\ N D \X'lli\T WE C.\N Do To STOP lr 60-61 {1989).
26
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total e:-..penses. 18 -ro()/ n of football ant..! basketball programs themsekes
bring in a profit of more than S1 million a year. In fact, during rhe
Unh·ersity of Texas' national championship run from 2005-2006, the
university reported O\'er$42 million in profit off the football team alone.
Other schools reported more than $30 million in profit the same year. 19
Secondly, uni,·ersity accounting .is not an exact and complete
scJence and is not equipped to account for all of the possible ways
d1at uniYersities profit off athletics. An economic study by Urian
Goff, a Distinguished University Professor of Economics at \'\'estern
Kentucky University, came to some interesting conclusions. Goff
concluded empirically that any sort of achievement in athletics brings
a significant increase (sometimes millions of dollars) in general
university contributions, not just in athletics. H e even found that a
major ach.ie,•ement in athlet.icc;, such as a bowl game or an appearance
in March l\Iadness, sparks interest fmm prospective students,
increasing a school's average SAT score. 21 ' After the "Cinderella" run
by George .Mason University to the Final Four, almost 400 more
qualified freshmen enrolled at dte university, forcing the urU\'"ersity to
house some in a hoteJ.2 1 Simply put, athletic programs bring national
exposure, and exposure brings more money and better students.
A similar study cut right to d1e heart of the exploitation issue. A
pair of economists initiared an econometric study to determine exactly
what a successful athlete pro,~ides his uni,·ersity-\vhatis referred to as the
marginal re' enue product. By using regression techniques on extensive
re' enuc data from almost all public and private un.iversi ties, the 199 5
study estimated that a successful football player (one who goes on to
play in the FJ .) brings in more than $500,000 per year in additional
18
Office of Postseconda~ Education, Equny in \thletic..c;, http: / / www.opc.
ed.govI athletics/m~in.asp Qast ,·isitcd Jan. 17, 2007).
19
Rod Gilmore, Colle~c FootbaiJ Players Desenc Pay for Play,ESPN.cmt,
Jan. 17, 2007 http:/ / sport.<>.espn.go.com/ espn/pnnt?id -2.,3362·~type =story.
20
Bnan Goff, Efft:cts of l 1nivcrsity Athletics on the Unh·ersity, in
Er o"o~nc.s or Co111 c;F SrnR1~ 65, R2 (John Fizd & Rodne~ Fort eds., 20114).
21
Andy Kat,., George ~lason's Campus Still Buning o,·er Hoops,
ESPN.coM, Nov. 2, 2006, http:/ /pro"]".cspn.go.com/ncb/columns/
stury?columnist=k:u;candy&id=2647166.
2~
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annual revenue for his university. A "premium" college basketball
player generates more than $1,000,000.22 These figures show just what
universities gain from the labor of uncompensated athletes-the study
clicl not even look at theN CAA or any commercial enterprises and what
they gain from the same labor. Such an unfair system bas been described
as having a "neoplantation mentalit:y"23- it's a modern form of slaYery. 24

IV THb ATHLETE PRL\IARlLY 1\$ A

STCDE~T

Opponents of a pay-for-play system recite two arguments
supporting the status quo: first, student-atbletes already receive
enough "payment" for their participation in sports-a free education25and second, student-athletes are recruited primarily to be students. A
closer look reveals the truth to be that "stutlent"-athletes are required
to put their emphasis on the field, and not in the classroom. Although
critics may have been correct when the NCAA was established
96 years ago, the arena of college sports has changed dramatically.
Though universities say that they git•e scholarships to
athletes, it'smorecorrectthatathletesearnscholarships from the university.
Due to NCAA rule changes a little more than a decade ago, players can
no longer receive a four-year scholarship. Universities are restricted to
granting one-year schoJar!>hips which, to the detriment of the athlete
as a studenr myth, are renewed by performance on the football field or
basketbaU court, not by performance in the classroom.26 The NCAA
does require that modest academic requirements be met by athletes,
but universities have fountl inventive ways around them. Critics also do
22
Robert\'\: Brown & R. Todd Jewell, Measuring ~larginal Revenue
Product in College Athletics: Updated Estimates, in EcoNOMICS Ol· CoU.El;E SPORTS
153, 154 Oohn rizel & Rodney Fort eds., 2004).
23
Steve \X'ulf, Tore that Ball, Lifi that Revenue, T!~ii.l\L\<;.~7.L'IE, Oct. 21,
1996, at 94.
24
Su Z L\IMUST, SlfjJra note 4, at 20.
25
Van Horn': Indus. Accident Comm'n, 33 Cal.Rpu:. 169, 172 (1963). Set
aLro TEL\.'-DER, tl(pra n ote 17, at 66.
26
Sten: l\lurp!1)" &Jonathan Pace, A Plan for Compensat.U1g StudentAthletes, BYU Eouc. & L. J., Apr. 1994, at 167, 170.
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not recognize the tremendous number of hours that athletes dedicate
w their sport, leav ing few for academic endeavors. NC,'\A bylaws limit
a student to four hours a day and twenty hours a week of "athleticaUyrelated acthities." Needless to say, universities have found a way aroun<..l
this rule, primarily through the implementation of "optional sessions"
and captain-led practices- which players are obligated to attend in
order to retain their scholarshipY It is actually estimated that athletes
devote anywhere between thirty to si'<t) hours per week to their sport.211
Furthermore, the "free-ride" scholarship packages athletes
receive are never sufficient to cover all of the typical expenses
a college student incurs. By NCAA regulation, scholarships can
include tuition, room, books, board, and nothing else (like spending
money, laundry money, movie money, etc.).29 Coupled with the
fact that many come from disadvantaged backgrounds·"• and are
forb idden to accept money from anyone upon whom they are not
legally dependent, it is clear why athletes complain that they are not
students in that they cannot afford to participate in common collegiate
practices, like going on a date or buying a pizza:11 Most do not even
have the option of supplementing their scholarship through outside
employment. Even though the NCAA does allow players to have
outside employment, they are limited to earning no more than 32,000
during the season. Moreover, most college athletes do not work
because their potential working hours have already been spoken for. 32
The NCAA also limits the number of scholarships a uruversit)r
may grant. Athletes without a scholarship, commonly referred to as
walk-on athletes, practice, train, and play just like scholarship athletes
but receive no compensation whatsoever. AJthough walk-ons are
traditionally not the "stars," they play an integral role in the success
27
28
29

30
31

SKim loRE, supra note 11 , at 325.
Zr~m \1 1ST, supra note 4, at 37.
T EI-·WOER, mpra note 17, at 72. Stt also id. at 69.
WL'LF, s11pro note 23, at 94.

I larry Bruinius, College Players Still Amateurs ... But Barely, CHRISTI \N
MoNnnR, ,\pr. 3, 2000, at 1, available at http:/ /wW\\~csmonitor.
com/2000/0403/p Is4.html. See also T EU...;DFR, mpm note 17, at 69-72.
32
G R£F.Nl..EE, supra note 9, at 1.
29
ScJF.NCE
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of a team. A recent lawsuit complained that the CAA permits
universities to grant only 85 football scholarships.33 \X'ith an average of
about 117 players on a Division I-A football roster, this leaves 25% of
the athletes participating without a!!)' form of material compensation.
To answer critics it also helps to look at the academic success
of these athletes. Men's football and basketball players, on average,
have lower GPAs and SAT scores than all other college athletes, and
they are significantly inferior to the averages of their respective student
bodjes.J~ Graduation rates are also much lower than national averages.
The Knight Commission II in 2001 reported the graduation rate of
men's football players at 48% and that of men's basketball players at
an appalling 34%. The rates have dropped even more in recent years.35
This would not be the case if universities actually valued education
more than athletic success. Even more damaging to the university's
image are the reports of rampant cheating on the behalf of athletes,
the purpose being to sidestep the modest NCAA mandated academic
requirements in order to help them maintain etigibility.36 One woman
admitted to doing more than 400 pieces of coursework for athletes at her
school. Many athletes receive preferential treatment from professorsearning C's eyen though they never eyen show up for class.r Although
they are rarely caught and sanctioned for such action, "Presidents,
boards of trustees, faculty, conferences, athletic departments, and
coaches have a!J played a role in subverting the educational mission.''3 ~

33
NCAA Sued (h·er Football Sd1olarship Limit of 85, USATuD.W.CO\J,
Mar 20, 2004, http:/ /www.usa roday.coml sportslcoUegelfootbali/2004-05-20scholarship-suit_x.hun.
34
ZJ)Ul\Lll)'T, supra note 4, at 39.
35
Paul D. Staudohar & Barry Zepcl, The lmpacr on Tligher-Education of
Corruption in Big-Time College Sports, in EcuJ'.;muc.'i OF CoLLLGE SroRTS 35, 45
Qohn Fizel & Rodney Fort cds., 2004).
36
See ZlM~.\Ll~T, .mpm note 4, at 4.
37
Gary D'Amato, Academic cheating occurs all the time, professor says,
MILWAUKEE J. SENliNEL, Mar. 14, 1999, at 18, available at Imp:/ /www.findarciclcs.
com/pIarticlesI mi_q n4 196I is_l9990314I ai_n10483813.
38
STAt 001-1 \R & ZLPhL, .Iffpm note 35, at 38.
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V L\BoR IssL t.s
The issue of rhe treatment of revenut:-protlucing college
athletes is not just an ethical one- it is also a serious legal one. For
years athletes h.we been crusading to be recognized as employees
of a university, ant! not just students. The benefits of such legal
recognition are two-fold: li rst, athletes woultl be able to receive
adequate compensation, thus eliminating exploitation issues, and
second, adlletes woukl be eli!:,>ible for workers' compensation in case
of serious injury in the course of play. One of the major legal Aa\\'S of
rhe current system is the lack of cm·erage for student-athletes; if an
athlete with recognized professional potential incurs a career-ending
injury in the course of play or practice, he is entitled to very little, if
any, money from the university. E'·en though he put his time, future,
and livelihood on Lhe line for a university, he receives nothing in return.
Remembering the fact that the majority of successful athletes underperform in the academic arena, this injured athlete has practically
no future prospects. It is precisely for this reason that athletes ha'e
battled universities ant! the CAA in court for bener co,·erage.
Players ha,·e won two major court banles during the past
fifty years, the first in the case of University of Dmrer t! Nemeth. The
court held that a foCJtbalJ player injured during practice was an
employee of the university and was therefore entitled to benefits
under applicable workers' compensation statutes. l t was resolved on
the fact that Nemeth was employed in maintenance at the campus
tennis center contingent on his success in playing football for the
universit:y.39 Nemeth was even told that "it would be decided on
the footbaU field who recej\'es the meals and the jobs." The coun
was "willing to look beyond the 'fictional' records of a student
employed to maintain a tennis court to the reality of the relationship
between the employment and the student's athletic participation."~ 0
39
Ju Uni,·. of Oenn:r , .. Nemeth, 257 P.2d 423 (Colo. 1953).
40
Linda]. Carpcmcr, \'{rockers' Compensation and the Scholarship Athlete,
53 j. HIGHFR Eott. 448, 452 (1982).
31
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Proponents of pay-for-play gained an even bigger victory in
T(m Horn tt Ind11sttial Accidmt Co111mission. Edward Gary Van Horn
was on scholarship to play football for a university and held no other
employment. He was killed in an airplane crash returning from a regularly
scheduled college football game. His wife and children sued for benefits
under the Workmen's Compensation Act and was initia1ly denied by the
California Industrial Accident Commission, but a California Appeals
Court overturned that decision. The court wrote, "There is authori ty
for the proposition that one who participates for compensation
as a member of an athletic team may be an employee within the
statutory scheme of the \X'orkmen's Compensation Act." The form of
remuneration-the fact that Van Horn was compensated in the fo rm of
a scholarship- was "immaterial." It •vas also held that "one may have
the dual capacity of student and employee in respect to an activity." 41
This precedent was not followed for long. More recent
decisions in other states have held just the opposite. I n both Rensing t!
Indiana State Board q( Tmstees and Cole!IJnfl v. lf/'estern iHichigan Unit•ersity,
it was determined that athletes on scholarship were not employees of
their respective universities. The first court based its decision on "the
weight with which the NCAA regards amateurism ... and the broader
educational-based priority the CAA routs as its chief concern for
student-athletes."·42 The second court refused to find that "the 'work
performed' (playing football), was an integral part of defendant's
'business' (education)."43 These claims have already been addressed;
NCAA players arc disguised as amateurs, the education-as-a-priority
ideal is untrue, and football and basketball prm·ide a fundamental
part of improving a university's image and pocketbook. As the scope of
college sports continues to becomemore commercial,courtsmayverpveU
return to the original idea of players as employees, thereby proportioning
a means for athletes to receive wages and workers' compensation benefits.
41
Van HornY. lndus. Accident Comm'n, 33 Cai.Rptr. 169, 173 (Cal. 1964).
42
Christopher\'\~ Haden, Foul! The Exploitation of the Srudent-Athlete, 30
J.L & Em c. 673, 677 (2001) .
43
Coleman v. W J\lich l 1ni,·., 125 .Mich. App. 35,40 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983).
32
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\' L. A \:TITRl"ST ls."il ' I.S
A second major legal issue facing college sports relates to the
Sherman Antitrust Act, which expressly prohibits "[e]\ery conrract,
combination ... or conspiracy, in restraint or trade or commerce." ~ The
NCAA amateurism rules, specifically the no-compensation rule, in many
ways represent an unreasonable restraint uf trade, and by the "rule of
reason" should be deemed illegal by the courts. NCAA rules ha,·e twice
been challenged unsuccessfuiJy in the courts, but the growing business
aspects of college athletics may alter the court's decisions in the future.
lt was originally assumed that the NCAA was not subject to
antitrust scrutiny because of its non-profit nature, but the Supreme
Court ended such speculation with its ruling in NCAA n Board of Rt!!,ents.
Although the case did not concern amateurism ruJes specifically, rl1e
Supreme Court maintained that the NCAA's current television p lan had
a "significant potential for anticomperitive effects," thus opening the
r CAA up to antitrust litigation on other froncs. 4; ln both McComlflrk 1:
NCAA and Bank.s t: NCAA it was held that the NCAA was not guilty
of antitrust violations in regards to its enforcement of its amateurism
rules. The courts supposed that CAl\ bylaws were not unreasonable
restraints of trade on the grounds that they promote competition,
encourage educational pursujts, prevent commercialism, and preserve
rl1e amateur nature of college athletics.-16 More specifically, the courts
determined rl1at NCAA rules and actions ought to be analyzed under
the ''rule of reason," which requires a determination on an action's
"impact on competition." This paper has already addressed the issues of
commercialism, amateurism, and education in college athletics. The only
remaining argument is the notion that NCAA bylaws foster competition
and are necessary to maintain the character of college sports.
As stated previously:, a number of economists dew the NCAA
as a successful labor cartel. One of the purposes of a cartel is to control
the market by controlling input prices-a violation of the Sherman
4

44

45
46

I L\OE:-;, slfpra note 42, at 673.
P.wr C. \\'HtrR. & G \RY R. RnBERTh, SPoR.TS
ld. at 611.
33

\"'I) TilE

L \\\ 591 (1993).
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Antitrust Act. Specifically, the NCAA, by requiring each institution to
offer recruits the same compensation package, limits competition in the
input market, thereby violating antitrust laws. 4 ~ Moreover, the NCAA,
in cooperation with all member institutions, maintains a monopoly
over amateur athletics; there is no alternative to participating in college
sports. Both the NFL and the NBA do not permit athletes to enter
their leagues straight from high school. A young athlete is forced to
develop his talents in an amateur league where compensation is strictly
forbidden, ''restraining [his] ability to market his services to competing
instirutions."48Justice White, although dissenting to the Board of Regen ts
decision, agreed, "[T]he NCAA imposes numerous controls ... many
of which 'are similar to those whkh are summarily condemned when
undertaken in a more traditional business setting."'49 AJso detrimental
to the NCAA's posicion is a study done by Craig A. Depken and D ennis
P. Wilson that shows that the enforcement of NCAA rules many times
unintentionally leads to a reduction in competiti,·e balance between
teams. 50 Another study demonstrated that many NCAA institutional
changes, many having to do ,\;th the preserYation of amateurism,
most likely have a "rent-seeking explanacion"-they reduce competitive
balance and seem to have a financial motivation above aU else.51
On the issue that the no-compensation rule is necessary
to maintain the character of college sports, what dle courts failed
to realize was that even as the system is now, many universities
47
Brad R. J lumphreys & Jane E. Ruscki, Monitor Cartel Beha,i.or and
Stability: 12\i.dence from NCAA Football, cr:... . TE;R FOR Eco 10MK RESEARCIJ c\ND
GR.\DU.\'f£ Eot:C.\TlON OF CH.\RLES u . . J\'ERSITY, Jan. 200 I' http:/ 1\\"-\'W.cerge-ei.cz/
pdf/ c\'cnts/ papers/0 11029_t.pdf. See also ZJMbALIST, Jt1'm note 4, at 18-19.
48
Stephen M. Schott, G i,-e Them What They DeserYe, 3 SPURTS L\\X'. J. 25
(1996).
49
Nat'! Collegiate Athletics Assoc. v. Bd. of Regents of the Uni\'. of Okla.,
468 U.S. 85, 122-23 ( 1984) (\X'hite, J., d issenting).
50
Craig A. Depken 11 & Dennis P. \X'il~on, The Impact of Cartel
Enforcement in NCAA Dh·ision 1-A Football, in Eco:smucs or Cot.LJ:.C.b SPORTS
225, 241 Qohn Fi~d & Rodney Fort eds., 2004).
51
Set Craig A. Depken II & D ennis P. \X'ilson, lnsrirutional Change in
1hc NCAA and Competiti\'e Balance in lntercnllegiate Football, in ECO"-Ut-llCS oF
CuLJ..E<;ii SPuRTS 197, 198 Qohn Fizel & Rodney Fort eds., 2004).
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frequently violate or find convenient w~ys around the rule. Over the
period of one decade it was found that at leaM 5711 'n of all NCAA
Di\'ision I-A football teams violated compensation rules. Players are
not amateurs and the public knows this, yet consumer demand foe
college sports continues to flourish like never bcfore. 5 ~ In some ca.ses,
teams sanctioned by the NCAA received even more support for their
programs than before being sanctioned.53 The anticompetitivc nature
of the NCAA rules has brought the orgttnization under fire before; it is
up to future courts to dig beneath the NCAA's claims of amateurism,
education. and competition and declare its actions ancicornpeLit.iYe.

VII. BENEFITS OF .\

P ,\Y- FOR-PLAY SYSTEM

"t\lany experts have attempted to design a pay-for-play srstem
thar's both fair to all involved (athletes, universities, and the NCA.i\)
and that maintains the unique qualiLies of college athletics that make
it so immensely popular. The proposed sysrems Yary widely, with
ingredients such as salary caps, trust funds for athletes, revenue sharing,
and much more. It IS noc the intent of this paper to propose a ne"\\system; rather, it is to show the specific benefits inherent in any payfor-play srstem, thus furthering rhe argument against amateurism rules.
One strong argumem in fa,·or of a new sysrem rests on the
premise that if an athlete already recci\·ed compensation above a
traditional scholarship and had adequate medical cm•erage in case of
severe injury, there would be less motivation ro lea,·e college early ro
play professional sports, chereb) better fulfilling the CAA's primary
ideal of education. More than half of all student-athletes in revenue
producing sports do not graduate54- many because they leave school
early for an opportunity to pia}' on tl1e professional level. Some succeed
but many do n<>t, leaving them young, unemployed, and uneducated.
The National Football League Players Association reports that the
52
Sherman .\ct lm-alidarion of the 1\CA.\ Rules, 105 Jl \R\". L. Rh\. 1299,
1312- 13 (191J2).
53
Jd. ;\( 1313.
54
STA!IDOH.\R & Zr::.PEl., mpm note 25, at 45.
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average length of an NFL career is only three and a half seasons. 55
Exacerbating the problem is the fact that most young players do not
plan for the future. Aftcr taxes of about 30% and extravagant spending,
which is all too common for young athletes, many athletes are left with
small income and large debt. 51• In order to survi,·e financially, athletes
must either invest their money well or have plans for another career
when they can no longer play professionally.5' FewwoulJ Joubt that the
best contingency plan would be ro remain in college until graduation.
lt should also be noted that the abolition of amareurisn1 rules
would allow student-athletes to accept outside endorsements, possibly
making the earnings of the most talented athletes attractive enough
to remain in school. While universities would only be required to pay
moderate hourly wages, national companies affiliated with college
sports and even local companies looking to advertise could provide
more .lucrative compensation to athletes according to market demand. 58
In fact, it would be mutually beneficial for these athletes to
remain in school because universities haYe much to gain from these
talented young men. By economk estimates, universities themselves
lose between $400,000 and $1.2 million a year when talented stars
declare for the draft early.5" Moreover, the underclassmen who
lea\'e school early are more often than not the most talented - the
Reggie Bushes of the world - and bring the excitement to college
sports d1at fans attend games to see. It is not a stretch to say that
the sports of college football and basketball would be gready
improved if the high-profile athletes participated for all four years
of eligibility. This would most likely lead to higher viewership, and
therefore more revenue for advertisers, TV stations, and the NCAA.
Only this time it wouldn't be at the expense of university slaves.
55
NFL Players Association - FAQs- NFr, Hopefuls Faq, http://www.
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VIII.

CoNCUJSLON

\'<'hen asked about the accusations made against Reggie Bush,
Joe Horn, a new teammate of Bush's, made an interesting comment,
"1 don't think Reggie did that, but if he did, I would have done it
too."6" Regardless of the veracity of the claims made against Bush,
the question remains: Can you really blame Reggie Bush, or any other
student-athlete for that matter, for accepting improper benefits? Does
the system really seem fair? Over the course of ninety years, the NCAA
has created a system that flourishes on uncompensated student labor.
And over the past twenty-five years, the majority of these students
have been low-income minorities. Although all have an opportunity
at the incomparable benefit of a uni,•ersit:y education, the majority
of athletes overlook academks and instead focus on the prospect of
playing their sport at a professional level. Sadly, the NCAA, universities,
and commercial enterprises thrive on such "student-athleres." The
Wall Street Journal commented almost a half century ago that in many
cases universities "have come to see-and treat- athletes less as students
than as tools to be manipulated for profit."61 Whether changes to the
present system will be initiated by the courts, the CAA, or member
institutions themselves is yet to be seen, but it seems fairly certain that
sibrnificant changes arc in order so that future athletes and their families
can trust the NCAA, and so that fans can continue to enjoy college
sports in all of the tradition and excitement that have existed for years.

60
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